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NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST

When NATO was established there was no reference to any territory beyond
that of the member countries and adjacent waterways -- the North Atlantic and
the Mediterranean.

NATO did not encompass any Middle Eastern territories

except for Greece and Turkey which were included in the alliance to provide
strategical advantage relative to the USSR in the unlikely event of a
conventional war.

NATO was a alliance aimed at the Soviet Union and in the

early days of NATO the United States and the Soviet Union pursued parallel
policies in the Middle East.

Indeed, as we all remember, the Soviet Union

beat the United States to the recognition of Israel by several

hours.

Divergences in policies regarding the recently created Israel and the rather
diverse set of Arab states in the region were to be found among allied
policies not between the so-called West and the so-called East.,
The Middle East was excluded from NATO territorial domain for several
reasons:

first, the geographical distance of most of the middle eastern

countries from the core of NATO which is the North Atlantic,

not the

Mediterranean; second, the strong unwillingness of the British and French
governments to encourage an active American role in the Middle East; and
third, the essential agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the
evolving state of affairs in the Middle East testifi~d to the lack of salience
of the region to U.S.-Soviet strategic position in Europe.
It is always tempting to rewrite history at subsequent stages when
analyzing relationships but it is critically important to keep the historical
record clear.

Indeed, if we look at the evolution of middle eastern policy,

we note that in its earliest stages, roughly from 1947 through 1951, American
and Allied policies expressed the colonial contradictions between American and
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Allied (principally British and French) policies.

The United States by 1947

was pursuing an anti-colonialist policy following its initial support for the
reestablishment of Western colonialism in Asia and the Middle East.

By 1947

the United States was pressing France to liberate Syria and Lebanon and
pressing the British about their colonial ties in Palestine~

The Dutch were

forced out of Indonesia and American policy was widely viewed to have assisted
in the granting of independence to India, Pakistan and Burma.

The policies of

the Truman administration were resented by European political leaders even
those whose government supported decolonialization (for example, Clement Atlee
and Aneurin Bevan in the U.K.).
The· resentment expressed against American po 1icy is not unfounded.

In

1947 U.S. policy shifted diametrically from that pursued by Truman from his
arrival upon the scene in 1945.
the

recommendations

of- his

Shortly after he assumed office, and despite
people

in

the

field

(including

the

ass

representative Archimedes Patti), Truman sought the advice of the British
Ambassador to the U.S.

which

led to the American policy decision to

reinstitute French colonialization in Inda-China.

About two years later the

same President Truman adopted a policy of literally forcing the Dutch
administration in Indonesia to withdraw from that colony.

The policy adopted-

in 1947 was more in line with that of the Roosevelt administration.
.

.

But while
.

some clarity and precision appeared in South East Asia, it would be difficult
to attribute much clarity and·precisi_on to American policy·in the Middle East.
French and British policies were not at all receptive to a diminished role in
the Middle East.
British policy ,n the ·region ·was informed by several factors; first,
continuity with its colonial past especially now that India, Pakistan and
Burma were no longer part of the British Raj. The decision to turn Greece over
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to the Americans -in 1947 coupled with the end of empire in the Indian
subcontinent strerigthened British desires to retain the presence in the Middle
East and encouraged the sense of re1iance upon the glorious colonial past.
Additionally, the notion that the Middle East might become part of an American
sphere of influence wa·s anathema to the British intelligentsia.

After all,

the Americans, while much less boorish than. the Russians were boori-sh.

The

British feld that American policymakers did not understand the subtleties
involved in middle eastern politics and were too prone to base policy
decisions on quick and dirty assessments.
A second basis for British concern rested upon perceived requiremerits for
.

.

reliable and stable supplies of oil flowing from the Persian Gulf region arid
the Arabian Pennisula.

British interest in Iranian and Arabian oil.certainly

went back to the early part of the century which found the British actively
irivolved in seeking to prevent any current or even potential Russian interest
in securing Iranian oil concessions.

(We must remind ourselves that the

Russians were formerly an oil importing country while the ·Americans were still.
heavily engaged in exporting oil).
A third general factor in the Brittsh approach rested upon a latent and
often not so latent anti-semitism on tlie part of British leaders.

British·

policymakers had little regard for the Wags of the region but had even less
regard for the Jews who were establishing· the basis for their state in
Palestine.

Not surprisingly, British policy was ambivalent and it came to the

question of which Arabs should rule or what subordinate role should be played
by Jews in a new emerging independent Palestine state~
French policy was slightly different from British policy in that while
. the_ British were preoccupied with
preoccupied by i~perial glory.

an

imperial role the French tended to be

French policy rested first on the premise that
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French. glory

(la Gloire

de France}

must

be reestablished.

With British

assistance and American confusion, the French were able to kick off the traces
of ~n axis past (Vichy France} and pr~tend that France was a victorious power
who helped to defeat. the Germans and the Japanese.

But Vichy was created by

Germany quite ·int_elligently as the device to transform

the enemy France into

the allied France which resulted in transforming most French colonies from
allied territories to enemy territories in World War II.

Thus, Inda-China was

neither invaded ·nor conquered by the Japanese rather it became a staging post
and

base

elsewhere.

for

Japanese

conquest -in

Malaysia,

Indonesia,

Philippines

and

Throu_gh conven·ient diplomatic maneuvering and political posturing,
.

.

General de Gaulle was permitted to play the role of the victor.
French

collaboration

provided

serious,

ideological

and

psychological

bases for French guilt and displac_ed animosity toward the Americans who were
easily dismissed as having no sensitivity and understanding of the role played
by France in the region.

We should also recall that during the great traumas

suffered by the French in the 1950 1 s and 60 1 s both in ·the Inda-China and North
Africa, the United States was neither sympathic nor supportive for the most
part nor did we act anymore as a .general ally than we had with the Dutch in
Indonesia in 1947.

The Americans did not confuse alliance in NATO with

collaboration in the colonial region or

in. regions somewhat distant from

NATO's territorial base.
Contrary to common usage, an alliance is not ·an association of states
which agree on everything.

It

is neither general

nor comprehensive. ·An ·

alliance is but a set of states acting in concert af a given time to enhance
their mutual security against a common adversary.

The high point of the NATO

alliance occurred in April, 1949 when the alliance was ·formed.

In •1949, the
.

United States had an absolute hegemony.in Western Europe and the u·.s.S.R had

.
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an absolute hegemony in Eastern

Europe.

As Western

European recovery

proceeded in the ensuing years, national policies expressing diverse interests
began to surface in an increasingly important and often discordant matter.
In 1949, all efforts were aimed at wedding American attention andinterest firmly in the support of Western European foreign policy and security
requirements.

As the U.S. subsequently localfzed its reactions to perceived

Soviet threatening behavior, Western European interest began to establish some
perceptible distance from American_ policy.

While all Western states supported

American- policy in Korea, European politic-al leaders began to show concern
that American involvement in Asia might weaken the American intent and capability to defend Western Europe from a direct threat.

Europeans, for

example, were not reassured by the rhetoric of the.Eisenhower administration
since it was accompanied by a significant demilitarization of American foreign
policy.

By the end of the Eisenhower term,- the - United States

lacked

sufficient military force to intervene effectively in another war such as
Korea.

While most European- countries fully supported this withdrawal from

military confrontation on the Asian continent, they also worried about what
would be augered by an inability of the American government to come to some
reasonable support of European states short of nuclear war.

Resort to the use

of nuclear weapons was so unlikely as to be ruled out of the question; yet, American -pol icy for the defense of Europe was based upon the concept of
massive retaliation which said that a defense of Europe ~ould require the use
of nuclear weapons which we made very clear were not to be used except in the
unlikely event of a direct Soviet military attack upon the United States -- an
attack which was technolo~ically impossible fcir almost a decade .Jater.
The United States response to the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian
uprising in 1956 and the Americ_an reaction to the British·-French intervention
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in Suez 1956, supported the general conclusion that the United States was lessthan a reliable defender of European interests.

Rather, the United_ States-was

seen to be defending American interests in· Europe.

There is a subtle yet

important difference that is directly related to the recently expressed
questions

concerning coupling

and decoupling

of European and American

policies.
Th~ intervention by -Britain ind France i~ Egypt in 1956 sought to force
E~senhower s hand by -leaving him no choice but to support the - "allied"
1

position.

But Eisenhower did not follow the same scenario; h~ demanded the

withdrawal of British and French troops and the removal of ,Israeli forces back
to Israeli territory by guaranteeing_ Israeli passage through the Suez Cana·1
and the Strait of Tiran even if the American Navy had to convoy Israeli ships
through.

The result of t~e failure of the invasion is familiar to all of us;

Nasser's position was strengthened, he was not forced out of office· as
intended by the Anglo-French move, and Israeli shipping did not obtain use of
the Strait and the Canal until after the peace treaty signed at Camp David.
The American guarantee to the Israelis was clearly hyperbole, not policy, but
the more significant result was the defeat of two friendly governments, one of
whom had convinced itself that it had a special relationship with the United
States.

Anthony Eden's government fell directly as a result of American

opposition to his policies in Suez; and, while the Fourth Republic managed to
limp on for two more years before it was subsequently overthrown in the coup
of 1958, the coup de grace was delivered at Suez.

How could French gloire

survive the defeat in Inda-China, the ravages of surging revolution in
Nigeria, and the ''betrayal" of the Americans as a result of Suez.
No-longer could any European regime claim that it enjoyed the sensitive
support of the United States.

Each European government_was now subject to the

.7

charge that its leaders were lackeys of American policy -- of a policy driven
by Americans who did not understand the subtleties and nuances of Middle
Eastern politics.

British and French political· 1eaders could not continue

what was cons.idered a
area.

charade of submitting· to American leadership _rin this

Anthony Eden was the most pro-American of any post-war British leader

and the Americans betrayed. him when he most needed their support. · And, the
Fourth

Republic

presidential
American

yielded

monarchy

direct ion~

to

General

which
When

de

established
de

Gaul le

Gaulle's

concept

clearly .French
led

France

out

of

a

French

independence
of

the

from

mi 1itary

organization of NATO,· the press mistakenly reported that he had abandoned
NATO.

He had done no such thing.

What de Gaulle achieved (and is still

practiced by the French government) was the establishment of the independence
of French foreign
Americans.

policy initiatives from the dom,inating presence of the

He sought to do this not to de 1 imit or diminish ·American security
~

guarantees for France vis

Vis the Sovie! Union; indeed, he simply moved

American forces farther North and East to Belgium and to Germany; he did not
seek to have American forces removed from Europe..

De Gaulle established the

independence of French pol icy most particularly to de.monstrate that French
interests and U.S. policies differed with respect to most of the Third World
particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
De Gaulle's demand for a ~irectorate of the Western Alliance comprising
France, Britain and the United States was but a pl9y to establish the notion
that were France to continue to participate generally :in American foreign
policy France had· to have a voice equal to the American President in the
making

of

that

policy,

that

France

could

not

be

led down the

path of

supporting the achievement of American interests when they were not at the
same time French interests.
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Now one thing an alliance is nrit is· an expression of common interests.
Alliance members in a very active alliance may try to find and establish
coalitions with respect to specific issues but the inte~ests do not become
·common any more than their experiences, attitudes and. desires become common.
During Suez, American interests in the Middle East were· somewhat episodic.
were not quite certain what we wanted to achieve in the region.

We'

We had not

yet decided with any precision what kind of formations ~hould exist other than
the continued existence of Israel. _Americans were not yet in need of Arabian
oil but merely wanted to protect o.il - supplies for our European allies- - an
almost philanthropic des ire.

In subsequent years we became more and more

· - involved-in the region until by the time of the overthrow of the Shah in Iran
by the forces of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the United States had identified
assorted interests far

in excess of anything that could be justified by

· statistical analyses of American dependence on imported petroleum or other
products.

Concomitant

with

the

newly

expressed

American

intensity

of

interest,- was the developing Soviet juxtaposition to American policy.

We

should recall that American and Soviet policy in the early post-war period was
very cooperative in the Middle _East.

Regardless of th~ reasons for it, the

U.S. and the Soviet Uni on together .brought pressure upon the French, the
,.

British, and the Israelis in 1956 although we Americans deplored the styl_e of
the Russian admonition to the Western Allies.

We collaborated with the

Russians in securing the end to all of the Israeli-Arab wars until after the
Yorn Kippur War ( 1973).

The Middle East has become a region that dr~matica l ly

underscores the European concerns for the· quality of American leadership vis~
vis the Soviet Union and we enter a very tangled web_ of Byzantine policies.
What has been evolving in recent years in the Middle East is an American
definition of strategic interest in the Middle East that differs widely from
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and somewhat threatens European access to the very resources that are needed.
The Middle East helps to establish the distance of the U.S. from diverse
European

polities

rather

coordinate alliance policy.

than

demonstrate the opportunity for

NATO to

After all it was the European members of NATO who

refused to permit their air bases to be used by American military personnel to
reinforce the Israeli's during the Yorn Kippur War in 1973.

Only the base in

the Azores remained open and that is of course not likely to be available
since the Portuguese Revolution.
There is fundamental disagreement if not outright conflict between the
American and diverse European positions among the member of the Alliance with
respect to the Middle East.

This stems from diverse interpretations of both

regional and global situations.

Most important is the American globalization

of conflict and rivalry with the Soviet Union.

The extent to which the United

States projects U.S.-Soviet rivalry into regional disputes, such as in the
Middle East, in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, etc., distresses Europeans who
are preoccupied with their own problems in the region.

Globalizing conflict

to the extent that all serious rifts are posited, in essence, as attempts by
international communism to sway events and men in distant places denies
legitimacy to the substance of regional and local conflicts.
Paradoxically, positing the Middle East situation as a principal area of
East-West discord denies the Russians a legitimate role in resolving Middle
Eastern conflicts.

Thus, while the Russians helped end the fighting in the

Yam Kippur War, they were denied any role in the evolving Israeli-Egyptian
peace accords signed at Camp David.

But not only the Russians were excluded,

so too were the British and French.
It is not surprising that there is a lack of concordance among the allies
with respect to the Middle East or any other extra alliance area.

Indeed, it
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should be surprising to find concordance within the alliance.

While it is

convenient to refer to NATO as a bloc it is only a bloc in relation to a
posture concerning a possible Soviet attack upon members of the alliance.

As

a multilateral alliance NATO is really set·of dyadic alliances some of which
are more important than others. Analytically, NATO is a set of two hundred and
forty dyadic alliances which operate within- the framework of the multilateral
alliance.

When we talk in the loose form of usual discourse, we sweep under·

the rug all sorts of diverse conflicts and disagreements among the allied
members.

To cite just two examples; the Anglo-Ic~landic

11

fisheries war 11 and·

the Greece-Turkey conflict over the i~lands in the Aegean and Cyprus .. While
the

11

fisheries war 11 has been long resolved, Greece continues to arm against

.Turkey i~ the guise of erecting a defence against .possible Soviet aggression
and. Turkey. arms against Greece under the same rationale.

Is it any ·wonder

that there is sufficient conflict within those diverse dyads with respect to
. policy affecting the Middle East?
Thus far this paper has focused on military-security matters relating to
the development of policy.

Yet, military-security issues are subordinate to

political-economic concerns in the development of· national policies despite
the apparent preoccupation by major powers.
among

nations

is

political,

not

military,

The essence of relationships
and

is

preoccupied

with. the

ambiguous goals of survival and well-being which are not necessarily achieved

qy

military-security

policies.

Particularly

in

democratic

countries

military-security policies are subordinate to conditions and perceptions of
economic well-being on the part of the body politic.

Questions concerning the

political economies of the individual countries take precedence eve~ over the
overarching

question

po 1itica 1-economic

of

quest ions

security
prompt

from

military

increasingly

attack.
difficult

And

the

confl ictua J

ll

relationships not greater solidarity among allies in the foreign policy arena.
We must relate some of the macro-political questions to the set of other
nonpolitical

issues

in order to wind our way through

this morass of

relationships.
-In the economic arena conditions of conflict among principal allies have
increased over the years at a more rapid and pressing r~te than conditions of
conflict

between

the

superpowers.

In

the

first_ two

decades

of

NATOintra-allied conflict was minimal because from 1949-1969 Britain and
France were dependent upon American ecoriomic goodwi 11 and Germany had no
independent po 1icy; that is, Germany adopted the very i nte ll i gent pose of not
asserting any political leadership which would have exposed her to collateral
attack.

It was during th~s period that the United States, as the hegemonic

power within the alliance, pressed for high levels of military cooperation but
only provided rhetorical
integration.

support for movements toward European economic

Real progress toward achieving true economic ,ntegrat ion of

Western Eurqpe would have been threatening to the American economic position
in Europe and elsewhere.

It is not at all surprising that the United States

helped to reinforce posturing rather than unification and equally clear that
the achievem~nt of unification among the European states was unlikely becaµse of essential rivalries.

The developing events of the decades since World.War

II have witnessed the rebirth of an economic nationalism and neo-mercantilism
that is more reminiscent of the 1920s and
period.

1

30s than of any other comparable

Nation- states engaged in competitive economic relations seeking to

establish positions of competitive advantage do not develop policies that seek
harmony; rather, they seek competitive advantage, if not primacy.
It is not s8rprising that NATO has not developed an energy policy, in the
true sense of the term; -i.e., regulating pricing, production, distribution,
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delivery, access and the like.

It is also not surprising that the European

Community has also not developed a real energy policy particularly in light of
the fact that few if any ,individual national governments have been able to
arrive at a rational energy policy for their economies.

What is left is a

scramble for national advantage in establishing access to energy sources at.
11

reasonable 11 costs which leads to competition that does not reinforce concepts

of identifying collaborative policies relative to the Middle East.

France and

. Germany, for example, seek to strike de~ls which assure access to adequate
petroleum supplies.
The set of economic relationships that had been developed at the end of
World War II were beginning to unravel by the late l960's and early 1970 1 s.
As was noted, largely as a result of American initiatJve, diverse Europea.n
powers and Japan became increasingly more important economic actors in ways
that were not well· understood· nor managed by the Nixon Administration which
was in other respects probably the most sophisticated administration in the
foreign policy arena since World War II.

The American .economic superiority

establi?hed as a result of the war began to deteriorate particularly under the
pressures of American preoccupation in Vietnam.
already been present.

But the warning signs had

American policy helped sow the seeds for what was to

become verinear a situation of economic warfare among the advanced industrial
countries.

West-West

conflict

in the economic

East-West conflict in the political sphere.

sphere began to outweigh

At the very time that the Nixon

Administration was managing its political relations with the Eastern bloc it
was losing its.position of managing its economic relations with its allies and
trading partners.
Despite the recent economic upsurge, by and large the United States 1
economic position has been declining since World War II although the trend
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line was not so clear until the m~d '70s. (In a similar fashion one can argue
that the British economic position has exhibited si_gns of secular decline from
roughly the last quarter of the nineteenth century through- to the_ present day).

The decline in the Amer-ican economic fortunes has had a major impact

upon the American political position both within and w_ithout the alliance even
th6ugh that impact wi~ hidden for sometime.

The relative decline of the U.S.

was more than offset by accelerated appreciation of West German,
Swedish and even French fortunes, for example.

Swiss,

Economically, .West Europe and

. Japan prospered as America declined and the _economic stakes for Western
. Europeans

became more

cherishable

and

required

defending

from

what. was

perceived to be intemperate or misguided U.S. economic policy while the Soviet
Union posed but a latent military threat to Western Europe.
policies .had

immediate

consequences

that - did

not

U.S. economic

reinforce a spirit of

cooperation.
The watershed for post-war economk pol icy is provided by the series of
events running from late 1971 to 1973 when the U.S. devalued, demonetized, and
floated the dollar.

The Nixon Administration yielded to a frustration that

had been building for some-years-and had not resulted from policies largely of
its own making.

The U.S. dollar had been significantly overvalued and the

Germans and Japanese particularly were·perceived to be prospering at American
expense.
a

U.S.

The American economic hegemony had been turned on its head yielding
admini~tration

first

pleading

for,

then

cajoling

demanding corrective action that has not yet taken pl ace.

and

ultimating

The Bret ton Woods

economic system was scrapped in large part and no replacement is yet in sight.
Economic policies among the allies came to be marked by a resurgent economic
nationalism; neo-mercantilism, and protection.

The imposition of nontariff

barriers has been accelerating since the end of the Nixon Admini'stration and
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shows no signs of diminishing.
The enveloping disarray in international economic relations has -been
accompanied by discordant energy policies whose pressures are currently abated
by what is likely to be a temporary oil glut.

The present excess of energy

supply .over demand results in part from the impact of -the global recession
which is still underway in Western Europe and shows signs of returning to the
U.S. and from Americ_an conservatio-n efforts encouraged by high energy costs.
But energy costs did not simply rise seeking some natural

level -- they

increased in large part in response to U.S. policy._ The rapid decline in the
dollar's value from 1971-1973 was .a factor since oil is priced in dollars.
October 1973 OPEC · increased oil

prices

in part to

11

In

punish 11 the West Jar

supporting Israel but also in order to recover value lost by the decliningdollar. - Further, the U.S.

urged Iran to press for significantly greater

increases in order to provide Iran with more foreign exchange to purchase
weapons and to promote conservation in the U.S.

At its December 1973 meeting

-I

I

i

OPEC added approximately seven dollars to its price per barrel bringing the
posted price to $12.65.

ability to

adopt

an

Kissinger was reported to have despaired at Congress'

energy_ policy raising

prices

adequate

to

promote

conservation.
The nexus of economic and energy policies had en~rmous consequences for
the- West and provided no particular advantage for the United States.

The

p6litical

not

sophistication

manifested

by the

Nixon

Administration was

matched in the economic arena and contributed to allied determination to
pursue economic and energy policies independent of the U.S.

Confidence in

American leadership was wanting; latent suspicions of American -insensitivity
and _inadequacy were aroused, only to be compounded by dismay at Watergate
which was neither understood nor appreciated in Europe.

Compo~nding European

75

distress concerning ·U.S.

leadership were the confusing ·alarms and s igna Ts

emanating from Washington regarding Angola, Somalia, the War Powers_ Act-, and
the Mayaguez Incident, and were reinforced by more recent American gestures in
Lebanon and in the Caribbean.
President Carter's signing of the SALT II agreement and subsequentlywithdrawing it from active consideration in the Se-nate was not reassuring to
Europeans who questioned the stabi 1itY of Amerkan leadership.

Neither was

the handling of the neutron bomb incident nor the Schmidt initiative regarding
the development

of

intermediate range weapons . in response

developed Soviet SS 20 missiles.

to the newly

Adding insult to injury was the handling of

th~ concept ~det~nte" by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and th~ flap that
developed over the question of the Soviet gas pipeline to West Europe which
was very badly handled by both the Carter and the Reagan Administratibns.

The

net effect of a 11 of -these diverse factors was. not to reinforce Eur·opean
reliance upon American

leadership but to encourage Europeans to seek to

establish their own bargains and deals wit~ respect to all of these issues.
In the economic arena we all witnessed the effects

of

the

immense -

transfer of wealth from energy consuming countries to the energy producers.
New holders of vast numbers of dollars brought-their·money into the financial
markets and the sources of -most of those petrodollars were Arab financiers.
The New York and London financial capitals became dependent upon Arab dollars
to transact their busfoess..

While the United States was somewhat immune to

the impact of Arab financing, Western European countries were not.

They now -

had a new economic giant to deal with and that giant was hostile to the
American supported position of the Israelis.

The impact of the new economk

realities, together with the introduction - by the u.s.s.R. of new and more
threatening modes of nuclear blackmail aimed at Western Europe tied to the
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discrediting of detente by American political leadership, _served as impetus to
European states ·to _establish their own policies.

They now had to have

independent economic policies which were competitive not only w1th the United
States but which challenged the premises of American policy.

European. publics

began to raise serious questions.about the increased danger of being linked up
to the· United States.

The increase in defense expenditures in the · United

States which began as a Carter Administration ·reaction to the Soviet invasion
of Afganistari was accelerated even further by the Reagan Administration which
has not yet demonstrated true resolve to deal with the Russians politically on·
the sensitive issues raised by the security dilemma.

The European members of

NATO feel that they are in an exposed position which places· them in the·
unhappy circumstance of being the most likely venue for the waging of a war
between-·the U.S. and the Soviet Union, unlikely as that eventuality remains.
What are the implications for all the~e factors for NATO and the Middle
East?

First, it is unlikely that there will be any coordination of policies

by the European states and the United States with respect to the Middle East.
The Europeans are increasingly going to be more receptive and supportive of
Arab claims than Israeli claims to questions of territory, status and even
longevity because of the impact of Arab petroleum supplies.
While the United States has demonstrated an ability . to refrain from
intervening in the· Iran-Iraq. War,· American posturing _on the situation in the
Persian Gulf was not terribly reassuring to European political leaders.

The

danger of an American challenge to the Russians relative to intervention
remains even while it is unlikely.· And were such intervention to occur,
I

.

.

. -

-

European access to the Gulf would be threatened.
A related

aspect

rests

precisely in the

distance from American policy.

area of establishing

some

Particularly with the ·introduction of the
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Pershing II and cruise missiles into Western Europe, there is a developing
need for European political leaders to demonstrate independence fro~ and, to
some degree, decoupling of diverse European foreign policies from that of the
United States.

Relations with Middle Eastern countries provides a very good_

opportunity for such an assertion of independence.
A-third factor that develops logically from the first two rests upon the
need for the maintenance of the- discrete separation of regional from global
conflicts.

This is related to the first two factors but should be stated

expHcitly.

The propensity of the United States and the Soviet Union, to

pr6ject their iriterests into regional disputes is destabilizihg and unnerving.
The greater the extent of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the more likely it will
be for reg1onal powers to seek to distance themselves from· the superpowers.
To some extent this situation should exist among the middle eastern
countries.

But it is difficult to be achieved.

Israel over the years has put-

all its eggs in one basket, not entirely -of its own choosing, by becoming so
inextricably tied: up in the American relationship.

While it likes to see

itself in the role of the "honest broker, 11 the U.S. starts from a premise of
commitment to the principal Israeli posit ions relative to status, territory,
etc.

In spite of disclaimers, the effect of the R_eagan Administration s .
1

intervention into Lebanon was the promotion of Israeli goals in the region.
Reagan may have conv i need himself otherwise, but Arab states and European
states were not blind to the eff~cts of U.S. policy.
A more difficult situation exists with the question of who are legitimate
actors who must be brought into any real attempts to establish regional peace.
_American policy to exclude the Russians from participating in any settlement
makes sense in ·terms of positioning American interest as primary in. the
region.

It has consequences at the same time:

particularly it creates the
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opportunity
arrangements.

for

the

Russians

to

impose

a - veto -upon

potential

peace

Of course, the United States may oppose reentry of a Russian

diplomatic presence into the Middle East because, for the United States, a
comprehensive settlement of disputes between Israel and her neighbors may be
less important than the exclusion of Soviet interests and involvement.
Survival rather than solutions of Middle Eastern disputes may b~ the best
practicable outcome attainable iri the forseeable future_.

If we recall the

wars and conflicts raging throughout Europe for centuries, and compare that
history of turmoil and upheaval to the relatively benign current situation, _we
may glean some useful insights.

It is likely that the sublimation of diverse

_competitive European claims to territory, -status, and position may ·have been
subsumed by the overarching conflict between the U.S. and the u.s.s.R: It was
not - until these two essentially European actors became the most important
European bloc leaders that indigenous European rivalries were surp~essed.

Th~

lesson provided by that experience is not a terribly optimistic one to be
- projected upon the Middle East.

But then Europe has had forty years of peace

and, to a large extent, prosperity.

Forty years of peace and prosperity would

not be such a bad thing for the Middle East.

